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Summary 
“Services” refers to a growing range of economic activities, such as audiovisual; construction; 
computer and related services; energy; express delivery; e-commerce; financial; professional 
(such as accounting and legal services); retail and wholesaling; transportation; tourism; and 
telecommunications. Services have become an important priority in U.S. trade flows and trade 
policy and of global trade in general, accounting for $752.4 billion of U.S. exports and 82% of 
U.S. private sector jobs. The types and volume of services that can be traded, however, are 
limited by their intangibility (as compared to goods), the requirement for direct buyer-provider 
contact, and other unique characteristics. The Administration is engaged in discussions on 
potential and existing trade agreements that include services as a significant component. For each 
agreement, Congress may consider legislation to implement the agreements in the future. 
The United States is the world’s largest exporter of services (14% of the global total in 2015) and 
the largest importer (10% of the global total in 2015). Rapid advances in information technology 
and the related growth of global value and supply chains have reduced barriers to trade in 
services, making an expanding range of services tradable across national borders. A number of 
economists have argued that “behind the border” barriers imposed by foreign governments 
prevent U.S. trade in services from expanding to their full potential. 
The United States continues to negotiate trade agreements to lower these barriers. It has been a 
leading force in doing so under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and in free trade agreements, all of which contain significant 
provisions on market access and rules for liberalizing trade in services. The United States is 
currently at different stages with multiple trade agreements that include trade in services: 
 Renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with 
Canada and Mexico;  
 Potential continued negotiation of the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), a 
plurilateral agreement outside of the WTO with 22 other countries;  
 Potential continued negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (T-TIP) free trade agreement with the European Union (EU), which 
would cover the world’s two largest providers of and traders in services; and 
 Potential new and updated bilateral free trade agreements with other partners. 
In each case, participants have difficult issues to address and the outlook for progress is uncertain. 
One issue is whether bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements would support or undermine 
the pursuit of a more extensive, multilateral agreement in the GATS.  
Congress and U.S. trade negotiators face other issues, including how to balance the need for 
effective regulations with the objective of opening markets for U.S. exports and trade in services; 
ensuring adequate and accurate data to measure trade in services to better inform trade policy; 
and determining whether further international cooperation efforts are needed to improve the 
regulatory environment for services trade beyond initial market access. This report provides 
background information and analysis on these and other emerging issues and U.S. international 
trade in services, in general. In addition, it examines existing and potential agreements, NAFTA, 
TiSA, and T-TIP, as they relate to services trade. 
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Introduction 
The term “services” refers to an expanding range of economic activities, such as audiovisual; 
construction; computer and related services; energy; express delivery; e-commerce; financial; 
professional (such as accounting and legal services); retail and wholesaling; transportation; 
tourism; and telecommunications. Services account for a majority of the U.S. economy—78% of 
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and 82% of U.S. civilian employment.1 Services are an 
important element across the U.S. economy, at the national, state, and local levels. They not only 
function as end-use products but also act as the “lifeblood” of the rest of the economy. For 
example, transportation services move intermediate products along global supply chains and final 
products to consumers; telecommunications services open e-commerce channels; and financial 
services provide credits for the manufacture and consumption of goods.  
Services have become an important component in U.S. international trade and, therefore, an 
increasingly important priority of U.S trade policy and of global trade in general. Services 
accounted for $752.4 billion of U.S. exports in 2016.2 
Rapid advances in information technology and the related growth of global value and supply 
chains are making an expanding range of services tradable across national borders. However, the 
intangibility of services and other characteristics have limited the types and volume of services 
that can be traded. A number of economists have argued that foreign government barriers prevent 
U.S. trade in services from expanding to their full potential.3 Under the Trump Administration, 
the United States may continue to engage in trade negotiations on multilateral, plurilateral, 
bilateral, and regional agreements to lower these barriers.  
Congress has a significant role to play in negotiating and implementing trade liberalizing 
agreements, including those on services. In fulfilling its responsibilities for oversight of U.S. 
trade policymaking and implementation, Congress monitors trade negotiations and the 
implementation of trade agreements. Congress establishes trade negotiating objectives and 
priorities, including through trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation and consultations with 
the Administration. More directly, Congress must pass legislation to implement a trade agreement 
requiring changes to U.S. law before it can enter into force in the United States.  
This report provides background information and analysis on U.S. international trade in services. 
It analyzes policy issues before the United States, especially relating to negotiating international 
disciplines on trade in services and dealing complexities in measuring trade in services. The 
report also examines emerging issues and current and potential trade agreements, including the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), and 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). 
                                                 
1 U.S. International Trade Commission, Recent Trends in U.S. Services Trade: 2017 Annual Report, May 2017, p. 24, 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4682.pdf.  
2 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Trade in Goods and Services table: http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm. 
3 See, for example, J. Bradford Jensen, Global Trade in Services: Fear, Facts, and Offshoring, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, August 2011, p. 7. 
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U.S. Trade in Services 
Modes of Delivery 
The basic characteristics of services (especially compared to goods) are complex due to their 
intangibility and their ability to be conveyed via various formats, including electronically and 
direct provider-to-consumer contact. To address this complexity, members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) have adopted a system of classifying four modes of delivery for services to 
measure trade in services and to classify government measures that affect trade in services in 
international agreements (see the text box below).  
Four Modes of Services Delivery4 
International agreements on trade in services, including the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which 
is administered by the WTO, identify four modes of supply of services:  
Mode 1—Cross-border supply: The service is supplied from one country to another. The supplier and consumer 
remain in their respective countries, while the service crosses the border. Example: A U.S. architectural firm is hired 
by a client in China to design a building. The U.S. firm does the design in its home country and sends the blueprints to 
its client in China. 
Mode 2—Consumption abroad: The consumer physically travels to another country to obtain the service. 
Example: A Mexican client travels to the United States to attend training on architecture and stays in a U.S. hotel. 
Mode 3—Commercial presence: The supply of a service by a firm in one country via its branch, agency, or wholly 
owned subsidiary located in another country. Example: A U.S. construction firm establishes a subsidiary in Europe to 
sell services to local clients. 
Mode 4—Temporary presence of natural persons: individual suppliers travel temporarily to another country to 
supply services. Example: A U.S. computer programmer travels to Canada to provide training to an employee. 
Identifying the various modes of delivery of services is important for measuring the volume of services trade. Each 
mode requires a different method of measurement, and the data derived from these measurements are not likely to 
be compatible across the four modes, that is, one cannot combine the data on services traded via Mode 1 with data 
derived from services traded via Mode 3 in order to obtain a total. Identifying the modes is also important for policy 
purposes because issues raised by trade in Mode 1 can be different from issues raised by trade in another mode. 
Therefore, knowing the different modes helps to frame policy issues and solutions. 
Overall Trends 
U.S. international trade in services plays an important role in overall U.S. economy and 
international trade. The wide-range of existing and potential services, from e-commerce to 
engineering, is delivered through multiple modes that often complement, or integrate with, one 
another.5 
Measurements of trade in services are captured in two types of data: cross-border trade includes 
services sold via Modes 1, 2, and 4, described above.6 The second set of data measures services 
                                                 
4 The description and examples of modes of delivery are based on, and adapted from, the description contained in 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), GATS: The Case for Open Services Markets, Paris, 
2002, p. 60. 
5 U.S. International Trade Commission, Recent Trends in U.S. Services Trade: 2017 Annual Report, May 2017, p. 21, 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4682.pdf. 
6 For example, the purchases by a foreign visitor of a hotel and of other services in the United States are counted as 
U.S. exports and such purchases by a U.S. visitor to a foreign country are counted as U.S. imports from that country.  
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sold by an affiliate of a company from one country in the territory and to a consumer of another 
country (Mode 3).7 
For cross-border trade, in 2016, services accounted for 34.1% of the $2,208 billion total U.S. 
exports (of goods and services) and 18.6% of the $2,713 billion total U.S. imports.8 Figure 1 
shows that the United States has continually realized surpluses in services trade, which have 
partially offset large trade deficits in goods trade in the U.S. current account.9  
Figure 1. U.S. Cross-Border Trade in Goods and Services, 1993-2016 
 
Source: CRS, based on data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Many services require direct contact between the supplier and consumer and, therefore, service 
providers often need to establish a presence in the country of the consumer through foreign direct 
investment (FDI). For example, providers of legal, accounting, and construction services usually 
prefer a direct presence because they need access to expert knowledge of the laws and regulations 
of the country in which they are doing business and they require proximity to clients. One 
question is whether this will change with advances in technology and as virtual presence by 
service provider becomes easier, allowing for greater cross-border trade. 
In 2014 (the latest year for which published data are available), U.S. firms sold $1,503.4 billion in 
services to foreigners through their majority-owned foreign affiliates. In 2014, foreign firms sold 
$918.7 billion in services to U.S. residents through their majority-owned foreign affiliates located 
in the United States.10 The data for cross-border trade and for sales by majority-owned affiliates 
are not directly compatible due to differences in coverage and classification.11 Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
7 Affiliates are enterprises that are directly or indirectly owned or controlled by an entity in another country to the 
extent of 10% or more ownership of the voting stock for an incorporated business, or an equivalent interest for an unin-
corporated business. 
8 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, online tool http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm. 
9 The current account includes trade in goods and services as well as income earned on foreign investments and 
unilateral transfers. 
10 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, online tool http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm. 
11 More information on services data can be found at http://www.bea.gov/international/
international_services_definition.htm. 
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data presented in Table 1 indicate that, in terms of magnitude, a large proportion of sales of 
services occur through the commercial presence of companies in foreign markets.  
Table 1. Services Supplied to Foreign and U.S. Markets through 
Cross-Border Trade and Affiliates, 2011-2015  
(billions of dollars) 
 U.S. Exports U.S. Imports 
 
Cross-Border 
Trade 
Through U.S.-
owned Affiliates 
Cross-Border 
Trade 
Through Foreign-
owned Affiliates 
2015 $750.9  $488.7  
2014 $743.3 $1,503.4 $481.3 $918.7 
2013 $701.5 $1,321.5 $461.1 $891.9 
2012 $656.4 $1,285.9 $452.0 $813.3 
2011 $627.8 $1,247.0 $435.8 $781.6 
Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, available at http://www.bea.gov. Foreign 
owned affiliate data lags by one year. 
Although services contribute to the value of manufactured and agricultural products, conventional 
trade data, which are not on a value-added basis, do not attribute any portion of their traded value 
to services trade. Data measure exports and imports of goods based on the value of the final 
product (e.g., medical device or t-shirt). Included in that measurement, but not disaggregated, is 
the value of such services as research and development, design, transportation costs, and finance, 
among others, that are imbedded in the final product. However, the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the WTO have undertaken a project to measure trade 
flows based on value-added12 rather than final cost. They estimate that in 2009, close to 50% of 
the value of U.S. exports of manufactured goods was attributable to services inputs.13 This finding 
suggests a larger role for services in international trade than is reflected in conventional trade 
data, and is likely to grow in importance with the growth of global supply chains. An economist 
at Standard Chartered also argues that there are discrepancies in trade statistics, showing that by 
traditional measures services are 20% of global exports but, by his estimates of value-added, 
services account for 45%.14  
Geographical Distribution 
The United States conducts trade in services (both via cross border trade and FDI) with many 
different regions of the world (see Figure 2). Europe accounted for the majority of U.S. cross-
border exports, with the United Kingdom (UK) alone accounting for 9% of U.S. services exports 
and 11% of services imports in 2015. Apart from the UK, 28% of U.S. exports of services went to 
the rest of Europe, while 31% of U.S. imports of services came from those countries. Canada 
accounted for 8% of U.S. services exports and 6% of U.S. services imports; China was 6% and 
                                                 
12 Trade in value-added is a statistical approach that estimates the source(s) of value (by country and industry) that is 
added in producing goods and services for export (and import). It traces the value added by each industry and country 
in the global supply chain and allocates the value-added to these source industries and countries. More information on 
Trade in Value Added can be found at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/whatistradeinvalueadded.htm. 
13 OECD, Interconnected Economies: Benefitting from Global Value Chains, Paris, p. 58. 
14 John Calverley, “The Global Economy Needs More Trade in Services,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2015. 
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3% respectively, while other Asian and Pacific countries accounted for 22% of U.S. exports and 
23% of imports of services in 2015. Japan’s consumption of U.S. services was similar to that of 
China but Japan accounted for approximately double the amount of U.S. services imports.15  
Figure 2. U.S. Services Cross-Border Trade by Geographic Region, 2015 
(Percentage of Total) 
 
Source: CRS, based on data from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Europe’s dominance in U.S. services trade is even more apparent when taking into account 
services that are provided through multinational corporations (MNCs) and their affiliates (see 
Figure 3). In 2014 (latest data available), 43% of services supplied by U.S. MNCs were to 
foreign persons located in European Union countries, 26% to foreign persons located in Asian 
countries, and 9% to foreign persons located in Canada. In 2014, 58% of sales of services to U.S. 
persons by U.S. affiliates of foreign-owned MNCs were by MNCs based in European countries; 
24% by MNCs based in Asia, Middle East, and Africa; and 10% by MNCs based in Canada.16  
                                                 
15 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), online tool http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm. Due to data 
limitations, BEA is not able to disaggregate all services trade data to a country or sector level.  
16 Ibid. 
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Figure 3. U.S. Services Exports through Affiliates, 2013 
(percentages of total) 
 
Source: CRS, based on data from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Trade by Services Type 
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis divides services into nine categories:17 
 Maintenance and repair services; 
 Transport; 
 Travel (for all purposes including tourism, education); 
 Insurance services; 
 Financial services; 
 Charges for the use of intellectual property (IP) (e.g., trademarks, franchise fees); 
 Telecommunications, computer, and information services; 
 Other business services (e.g., research and development, accounting, 
engineering); and 
 Government goods and services. 
In 2015, U.S. exports covered a diverse range of services (see Figure 4). Travel accounted for the 
largest percent of cross-border U.S. exports at 27%. Royalties and fees generated from 
intellectual property as well as other business services contributed another 17% and 18% 
respectively. Transportation and financial services were 12% and 14% respectively of cross-
border exports.18  
                                                 
17 As of June 4, 2014, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) updated its presentation of trade in services to align 
with the International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Manual. For additional information, see “Comprehensive 
Restructuring and Annual Revision of the U.S. International Transactions Accounts,” published in the July 2014 BEA 
Survey of Current Business. 
18 Ibid. 
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Figure 4. U.S. Services Exports by Type of Service 
 
Source: CRS, based on data from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Notes: n.i.e. = not included elsewhere. 
Sales of services by MNCs via commercial presence (Mode 3) include a broader range of 
industries. In 2014 (latest data available), 25% of the value of services sold to foreign persons by 
U.S.-owned MNCs was from wholesale and retail trade services. Additionally, financial services 
accounted for 15% of the value; sales of professional services, including computer systems 
management and design, architectural, engineering, and other professional services for 16%; 
information-related services for 15%; and “other industries” (a category that includes mining, 
utilities, transportation, and other services) for 19%. Manufacturing accounted for the smallest 
share at 2%, followed by real estate at 4%.19  
The total value of services supplied to U.S. persons by U.S. affiliates of foreign MNCs was less 
than two-thirds the size of the value of services supplied to foreign persons by U.S.-owned 
MNCs. The composition of the services supplied, though, was similar in both directions. In 2014, 
for sales of services to U.S. persons by U.S. affiliates of foreign MNCs, wholesale and retail trade 
accounted for 22%, and financial services providers for 20%. Another 22% was by providers 
from “other industries.”20 
Trade in ICT and Potentially ICT-Enabled Services 
In October 2016, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Statistics began to identify trade in Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) and potentially ICT-enabled services, reflecting the growth and economic impact of digital trade and 
digitally-enabled services. ICT services include telecommunications and computer services as well as related charges 
for the use of intellectual property (e.g., licenses and rights). In addition, ICT-enabled services are those services with 
outputs delivered remotely over ICT networks such as online banking or education. For many types of services, 
however, the actual mode of delivery is not known (e.g., a consumer could go to a bank to conduct a transaction or 
do so online). As such, BEA tracks potentially ICT-enabled services which include a variety of services, including 
                                                 
19 Ibid. Note that U.S. Bureau of Economic Affairs uses the terms “MNE” to signify multinational enterprises which is 
equivalent to MNC, “MOUSAs” for majority-owned U.S. affiliates, and “MOFAs” for majority-owned foreign 
affiliates.  
20 Ibid.  
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insurance and financial services, as well as many business services like research, architectural, and engineering services 
which could be delivered electronically.  
In 2015, exports of ICT services accounted for $65 billion of U.S. exports while potentially ICT-enabled services 
exports were another $399 billion, demonstrating the impact of the Internet and digital revolution. Together, ICT and 
potentially enabled ICT services were 62% of total U.S. service exports in 2015 (and 57% of U.S. service imports). 
(For more information, see Grimm, Alexis N., BEA, Trends in U.S. Trade in Information and Communications Technology 
(ICT) Services and in ICT-Enabled Services, May 2016, 
http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2016/05%20May/0516_trends_%20in_us_trade_in_ict_serivces2.pdf). 
World Trade in Services 
Globally, the OECD finds that services account for over two-thirds of global GDP and three-
quarters of global FDI in advanced economies.21 The WTO recorded a 6% decline in the value of 
global services exports and attributes a large portion of the decline to changes in exchange rates, 
especially given the depreciation of the euro and pound as well as other currencies against the 
dollar.22 A decline in merchandise trade may also impact trade in services if fewer services are 
needed for tracking, transport, and supply chain management. 
The United States is a major exporter and importer of services in global markets. According to the 
WTO, if the European Union (EU)23 countries are treated separately, the United States was the 
largest single-country exporter (14.5%) and importer (10.2%) of global commercial services in 
2015 (see Table 2). The United States was the second-largest exporter (18.8%) and importer 
(12.9%) in 2015, if the EU is treated as a single entity (see Table 3). 
Table 2. Commercial Services Trade: Leading Exporters and Importers, 2015  
Rank Exporter 
Value 
($ bn) 
Share 
(%) 
Annual 
% 
Change  Rank Importer 
Value 
($ bn) 
Share 
(%) 
Annual 
% 
Change 
1 United 
States  
690 14.5 0  1 United 
States 
469 10.2 3 
2 United 
Kingdom  
345 7.3 -5  2 China 466 10.1 3 
3 China  285 6.0 2  3 Germany 289 6.3 -12 
4 Germany  247 5.2 -9  4 France 228 4.9 -9 
5 France  240 5.0 -13  5 United 
Kingdom 
208 4.5 -1 
6 Netherlands  178 3.7 -9  6 Japan 174 3.8 -9 
7 Japan  158 3.3 0  7 Netherlands 157 3.4 -9 
8 India  155 3.3 0  8 Ireland 152 3.3 4 
9 Singapore  139 2.9 -7  9 Singapore 143 3.1 -8 
10 Ireland 128 2.7 -5  10 India 122 2.7 -4 
                                                 
21 OECD (2017), Services Trade Policies and the Global Economy, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/
10.1787/9789264275232-en. 
22 World Trade Organization, World Trade Statistical Review 2016, 2017, p. 23, https://www.wto.org/statistics. 
23 As of December 2014, the EU includes 20 member countries. 
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Source: World Trade Organization, World Trade Statistical Review 2016, p. 96. 
Note: Based on Balance of Payments data that may underestimate some items. 
Table 3. Commercial Services Trade: Leading Exporters and Importers, 2015  
Rank Exporter 
Value  
($ bn) 
Share 
(%) 
Annual 
% 
Change  Rank Importer 
Value 
($ bn) 
Share 
(%) 
Annual 
% 
Change 
1 Extra-EU(28) 
exports 
915 24.9 -9  1 Extra-
EU(28) 
exports 
732 20.2 -7 
2 United 
States 
690 18.8 0  2 United 
States 
469 12.9 3 
3 China 285 7.8 2  3 China 466 12.9 3 
4 Japan 158 4.3 0  4 Japan 174 4.8 -9 
5 India 155 4.2 0  5 Singapore 143 3.9 -8 
6 Singapore 139 3.8 -7  6 India 122 3.4 -4 
7 Switzerland 108 2.9 -7  7 Korea, 
Republic of 
112 3.1 -2 
8 Hong Kong, 
China 
104 2.8 -2  8 Canada 95 2.6 -11 
9 Korea, 
Republic of 
97 2.6 -13  9 Switzerland 92 2.5 -6 
10 Canada 76 2.1 -10  10 Russian 
Federation 
87 2.4 -27 
Source: World Trade Organization, World Trade Statistical Review 2016, p. 97. 
Note: Excludes Intra-EU trade. 
Global Value Chains and Services 
U.S. firms are using advances in information technology and expanding global value chains to 
bring goods and services to market. Today, more than half of global manufacturing imports are 
intermediate goods traveling within supply chains while over 75% of the world’s services imports 
are intermediate services.24 Intermediate services embedded within a value chain include not only 
transportation and distribution to move goods along, but also research and development, design 
and engineering, as well as business services such as legal, accounting, or financial services. As 
manufacturing and agriculture grow more complex and technologically advanced, their 
consumption of services also grows. 
With U.S. firms supplying many of the world’s services, these findings imply that more U.S. 
services are traded internationally than traditional trade statistics indicate, and that many more 
service industry jobs in the United States are linked to international trade than traditionally 
thought. In addition, the disaggregation of value chains into smaller pieces, or modules, opens up 
domestic and international business opportunities to specialized firms or small or mid-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) who can focus on one piece. As such, the strategic and potential economic 
                                                 
24 De Backer, K. and S. Miroudot (2013), "Mapping Global Value Chains", OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 159, 
OECD Publishing, Paris, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3v1trgnbr4-en. 
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impact of both trade barriers and efforts to liberalize trade in services may be greater than many 
people realize. The growth of global value chains (GVCs) in which economic activities are 
fragmented across multiple countries and regions has heightened the interdependence and 
interconnectedness of economies. U.S. industries could potentially gain access to a wider 
marketplace for raw materials, less expensive labor, lower production costs, as well as talents and 
specializations from across the world. By creating global supply chains, businesses may increase 
productivity and efficiency, lower costs, and create new offerings for companies and consumers. 
Using global supply chains, however, entails potential costs and risks. Managing a complex 
supply chain across countries and/or time zones can be difficult and create additional costs. Some 
analysts point out that the benefits of increasingly interconnected supply chains may also be 
offset by potential costs associated with over-reliance on foreign or dispersed suppliers, or 
increased exposure or vulnerability to intellectual property rights theft or external shocks from 
abroad, such as environmental disaster (e.g., earthquake) or market disturbances (e.g., financial 
crash or truck driver strike).25  
Global value chains have expanded and redefined the role that services play in international trade 
and are one reason for the growth in services. Furthermore, GVCs may also serve as a motivator 
for countries involved at any point along a global value chain to seek more open and level 
markets for moving intermediate goods and service imports and exports. According to one study, 
a domestically manufactured good contains over 20% of foreign value added in many countries, 
and over 50% in some countries and industries.26 Similarly, imported goods often contain a 
significant amount of domestic content. For example, a French wine imported into the United 
States may be transported by a U.S. express delivery service and use a label designed and printed 
by a U.S. marketing firm, while a gadget assembled domestically and exported by a U.S. firm 
may not only have components from abroad but also may rely on foreign research and 
engineering skills.  
The WTO’s “Made in the World” initiative finds that the increase use of GVCs has led industries 
to demand greater trade liberalization and lower protectionism as these firms depend on other 
links in the value chain, both domestic and foreign.27  
Barriers to Trade in Services 
Liberalizing trade for services can be more complex than for goods, as the impediments that 
service providers face are often different from those faced by goods suppliers. Many impediments 
in goods trade—tariffs and quotas, for example—are at the border. 
By contrast, restrictions on services trade occur largely within the importing country, “behind the 
border” barriers. Some of these restrictions are in the form of government regulations. The right 
of governments to regulate service industries is widely recognized as prudent and necessary to 
protect consumers from harmful or unqualified providers. For example, doctors and other medical 
personnel must be licensed by government-appointed boards; lawyers, financial services 
providers, and many other professional service providers must be also certified in some manner. 
In addition, governments apply minimum capital requirements on banks to ensure their solvency. 
                                                 
25 Aaditya Mattoo, Services Trade and Regulatory Cooperation, E15, July 2015, http://e15initiative.org/. 
26 Emily J. Blanchard, Chad P. Bown, and Robert C. Johnson, "Global Supply Chains and Trade Policy [Preliminary]," 
October 16, 2015, http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/emily-j-blanchard. 
27 Yildirim Aydin, Value added trade, global value chains, and trade policy: renewed push for trade liberalization., 
University of Antwerp (Centre for Institutions and Multilevel Politics), WTO Made in the World discussion forum, 
September 1, 2015, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/paper_january15_e.htm. 
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Each government can determine what it deems to be a prudent level of regulation. However, one 
concern in international trade is whether these regulations are applied to foreign service providers 
in a discriminatory and unnecessarily trade restrictive manner that limits market access. Because 
services transactions more often require direct contact between the consumer and provider than is 
the case with goods trade, many of the “trade barriers” that foreign companies face pertain to the 
establishment of a commercial presence in the consumers’ country in the form of direct 
investment (Mode 3) or to the temporary movement of providers and consumers across borders 
(Modes 2 and 4). 
The GATS under the WTO identifies specific “market access” restrictions as proscribed under its 
provisions. These include limits on the following: the number of foreign service suppliers, the 
total value of service transactions or assets, the number of transactions or value of output, the type 
of legal entity or joint venture through which services may be supplied, and the share of foreign 
capital or total value of foreign direct investment. 
In many cases the impediments are government regulations or rules that are ostensibly legitimate 
but may intentionally or unintentionally discriminate against foreign providers and impede trade. 
Examples of such barriers include the following: 
 restrictions on international payments, including repatriation of profits, 
mandatory currency conversions, and restrictions on current account transactions; 
 requirements that foreign professionals pass certification exams or obtain extra 
training that is not required for local nationals; 
 forced localization requirements; 
 restrictions on data flows and information transfer imposed to protect data and 
maintain privacy or other localization requirements; 
 “buy national” requirements in government procurement; 
 lack of national treatment in taxation policy or protection from double taxation; 
 government-owned monopoly service providers and requirements that foreign 
service providers use a monopoly’s network access or communications 
connection providers; 
 government subsidization of domestic service suppliers; 
 discriminatory licensing and certification of foreign professional services 
providers;  
 restrictions on the movement of personnel, including temporary business visa and 
work permit restrictions; and 
 limitations on foreign direct investment, such as equity ceilings; restrictions on 
the form of investment and rights of establishment, that is, a branch, subsidiary, 
joint venture, etc.; and requirements that the chief executive officer or other high-
level company officials be local nationals or that a certain proportion of a 
company’s directors be local nationals.28 
                                                 
28 OECD, Working Party of the Trade Committee Assessing Barriers to Trade in Services—Revised Consolidated List 
of Cross-Sectoral Barrier, Paris, February 28, 2001. 
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The Economic Effects of Barriers to Services Trade 
As the most significant barriers to trade in services are not readily quantifiable, measuring their 
effects is challenging. Economists have constructed methods to at least estimate the effects, which 
can help to inform trade policy. However, these studies have limitations, are sensitive to the 
assumptions made, and may not necessarily reflect the entire range of factors influencing trade 
flows. Another consideration is that, as restrictions to trade are eliminated, cross-border trade via 
modes 1, 2, and 4 could grow at the expense of mode 3 if local presence is no longer a 
requirement to provide services in a particular country. However, removal of restrictions on 
foreign investment could offset any potential decline over the long term.29 
Most economists argue that by reducing overall barriers to trade in services, economies can more 
efficiently allocate resources, increasing general economic welfare. Opponents of liberalization in 
trade in services argue, however, that the United States would be forced to relinquish some 
regulatory control that could affect the viability of service sectors. 
Economists at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) published the results of 
one such method in several related studies. They first determined that U.S. trade in “business 
services”—a category that includes such activities as information, financial, scientific, and 
management services—is lower than one might expect given U.S. comparative advantage in those 
services. To come to this conclusion, the PIIE economists first determined that many business 
services are tradable, that is, capable of being sold from one region to another because many of 
them are “traded” between regions within the United States. Based on these assumptions, they 
compared the trade profiles of manufacturing firms and those of service firms and concluded that 
while about 27% of U.S. manufacturing firms export, only 5% of U.S. firms providing business 
services engage in exporting, even though the United States has a comparative advantage in 
business services. The PIIE study concludes that foreign government trade barriers are a major 
factor in the relatively low participation of U.S. service providers in trade. It also calculated the 
export/total sales ratios of manufacturing firms compared to business services firms, with the 
former being 0.20 and the latter 0.04. The study argues that if the ratio of business services could 
be raised to 0.1 or half of the manufacturers’ ratio, it would increase total U.S. goods and services 
exports by 15%.30 Given that four-fifths of the U.S. private sector workforce is in services, a 
change in the ratio of exporting service businesses could have a significant impact.31 Presumably, 
U.S. imports of services would also increase.  
Nontariff barriers for services specifically related to digital trade and data flows establish 
restrictions that may impact what a firm offers in a market or how it operates. For example, data 
transfer regulations that restrict cross-border data flows (“forced” localization barriers to trade), 
such as requiring locally based servers, may limit the type of financial transactions and services 
that a firm can sell in a given country (see text box below). Similarly, country-specific data 
regulations may create a disincentive for U.S. firms to invest in certain markets if a firm is 
hindered in its ability to export its own data from a foreign affiliate to a U.S.-based headquarters 
in order to aggregate and analyze information from across its global operations. The proponents 
of data localization seek to ensure privacy of citizens, security, and domestic control. Others point 
                                                 
29 For more information, see Tamar Khachaturian and David Riker, The Effects of U.S. Trade Agreements on Foreign 
Affiliate Transactions in Services, U.S. International Trade Commission, Working Paper 2017-03-C, March 2017, 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/fta_mt.pdf. 
30 Gary Hufbauer, J. Bradford Jensen, and Sherry Stephenson, Framework for the International Services Agreement, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief, Number PB12-10, April 2012, p. 19. 
31 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Trade in Services Agreement, Issue Brief, April 16, 2015. 
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out that maintaining data within a country does not necessarily guarantee security or protect a 
country from exposure to foreign attacks.32 Opponents of localization restrictions on digital trade 
also point to lost efficiencies and increased costs of not allowing a free flow of information across 
borders. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, based on 2014 estimates, 
decreasing barriers to cross -border data flows would increase GDP in the United States by 0.1% 
to 0.3%.33  
Localization Requirements as Trade Barriers 
Localization requirements by other countries can create trade barriers to U.S. businesses, whether in developed or 
developing economies. For example, under a Canadian federal initiative to consolidate information technology 
services across 63 Canadian federal government email systems, the government prohibits the contracting company 
from allowing data to go outside of Canada based on a national security rationale. U.S. firms leveraging new 
technologies such as cloud-based services are therefore precluded from competing for the project. U.S. federal 
agencies may impose similar requirements. Also citing national security, China passed its cybersecurity law which 
requires companies that collect information on Chinese citizens to keep those data stored on domestic servers. 
Abiding by such laws creates a challenge for U.S. companies seeking to do business in the growing Chinese market.34 
An Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study on services trade 
restrictions analyzed the relationship between services trade restrictions, cross-border trade in 
services, and trade in downstream manufactured goods.35 The study finds that more restrictive 
countries not only import less in services but also export less, suggesting that restrictions also hurt 
the competitiveness of domestic industry. The negative effect of trade restrictions holds true 
across the various service sectors the researchers investigated. Financial services saw the greatest 
impact when restrictions changed; limitations on financial services were mostly in the form of 
market entry restrictions such as equity limits. Another OECD study finds that SMEs benefit 
relatively more compared to larger multinational firms from the reduction in market access 
barriers.36 
According to the OECD Service Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI),37 the United States has a 
relatively open and competitive business environment in comparison to the 40 countries included 
in the study, as foreign providers have access and are allowed to compete equally in most sectors 
in the United States. The United States scored as the most open country for sound recording, 
motion pictures, and distribution services, as reflected by the highly competitive U.S. industry in 
these sectors. On the other hand, the study identifies air transport, maritime transport, and courier 
services as the U.S. business sectors with the most restrictions impacting foreign firms seeking to 
do business in the country. The STRI can also show the impact of a country’s reform efforts. For 
                                                 
32 For more on data vulnerabilities and cybersecurity, see CRS Report R43317, Cybersecurity: Legislation, Hearings, 
and Executive Branch Documents, by Rita Tehan.  
33 United States International Trade Commission, Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 2, 2014, 
pp. 13-14. 
34 Ambassador Michael B.G. Froman, 2015 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, Office of the 
United States Trade Representative, 2015, p. 150, and Bloomberg News, “China Adopts Cybersecurity Law Despite 
Foreign Opposition,” Bloomberg BNA, November 7, 2016.  
35 Nordås, H. K. and D. Rouzet (2015), “The Impact of Services Trade Restrictiveness on Trade Flows: First 
Estimates”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 178, OECD Publishing. 
36 OECD (2017), Services Trade Policies and the Global Economy, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/
10.1787/9789264275232-en. 
37 OECD, Services Trade Restrictiveness Index, http://www.oecd.org/tad/services-trade/services-trade-restrictiveness-
index.htm.  
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example, reforms by Indonesia in 2016 reduced its trade restrictiveness in particular sectors, 
including sound recording and air transport, compared to 2014.38 
The United States has worked with trading partners to develop and implement rules on several 
fronts in order to reduce barriers and facilitate trade in services without infringing on the 
sovereign rights of governments to regulate services for prudential and sound regulatory reasons. 
The broadest and most challenging in terms of the number of countries involved are the 
multilateral rules contained in the GATS that entered into force in 1995 and are administered by 
the 161-member World Trade Organization (WTO). The United States has also sought to go 
beyond the GATS (WTO-plus) under more comprehensive rules in the free trade agreements 
(FTAs) it has in force and presumably in upcoming discussions on NAFTA. The Administration 
may also decide to continue services discussions in TiSA and T-TIP. The U.S. overall objective in 
each of these fora has been to establish a more open, rules-based trade regime that is flexible 
enough to increase the flow of services and to take into account the expansion of types of 
services, but clear enough to not impede the ability of governments to regulate the sectors.  
One complication for the United States is that while trade negotiations are handled by the federal 
government, it is often the states that regulate services, including licensing and certification 
requirements. While regulations may vary across states, they all must comply with the 
commitments made by the federal government in international trade agreements. 
The WTO and GATS 
The seeds for multilateral negotiations in services trade were planted more than 40 years ago. In 
the Trade Act of 1974, Congress instructed the Administration to push for an agreement on trade 
in services under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during the Tokyo Round 
negotiations. While the Tokyo Round concluded in 1979 without a services agreement, the 
industrialized countries, led by the United States, continued to press for its inclusion in later 
negotiations. Developing countries, whose service sectors are less advanced than those of the 
industrialized countries, were reluctant to have services included. Eventually services were 
included as part of the Uruguay Round negotiations launched in 1986.39 At the end of the round in 
1993, countries agreed to a new set of rules for services, the GATS, and a new multilateral body, 
the WTO, to administer the GATS, the GATT, and the other agreements reached. 
The GATS 
The GATS provides the first and only multilateral framework of principles and rules for 
government policies and regulations affecting trade in services among the 161 WTO countries 
representing many levels of economic development. In so doing, it provides the foundation or 
floor on which rules in other agreements on services are based. As with the rest of the WTO, the 
GATS has remained a work in progress. The agreement is divided into six parts.40  
                                                 
38 OECD (2017), Services Trade Policies and the Global Economy, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 53, DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264275232-en. 
39 Geza Feketekuty, International Trade in Services: An Overview and Blueprint for Negotiations, American Enterprise 
Institute,. Ballinger Publishers. 1988, p. 194. 
40 This description of the GATS is based on WTO Secretariat—Trade in Services Division. An Introduction to the 
GATS, October 1999, available at http://www.wto.org. Not all services issues were resolved when the Uruguay Round 
was completed in 1993. 
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Part I (Article I) defines the scope of the GATS. It provides that the GATS applies 
 to all services, except those supplied in the routine exercise of government 
authority; 
 to all government barriers to trade in services at all levels of government—
national, regional, and local; and 
 to all four modes of delivery of services. 
Part II (Articles II-XV) presents the “principles and obligations,” some of which mirror those 
contained in the GATT for trade in goods, while others are specific to services. They include 
 unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN), nondiscriminatory treatment—
services imported from one member country cannot be treated any less favorably 
than the services imported from another member country;41 
 transparency—governments must publish rules and regulations; 
 reasonable, impartial, and objective administration of government rules and 
regulations that apply to covered services; 
 monopoly suppliers must act consistently with obligations under the GATS in 
covered services; 
 a member incurring balance of payments difficulties may temporarily restrict 
trade in services covered by the agreement; and 
 a member may circumvent GATS obligations for national security purposes. 
Part III (Articles XVI-XVIII) of the GATS establishes market access and national treatment 
obligations for members. The GATS 
 binds each member to its commitments once it has made them, that is, a member 
country may not impose less favorable treatment than what it has committed to; 
 prohibits member-country governments from placing limits on suppliers of 
services from other member countries regarding the number of foreign service 
suppliers, the total value of service transactions or assets, the number of 
transactions or value of output, the type of legal entity or joint venture through 
which services may be supplied, and the share of foreign capital or total value of 
foreign direct investment; 
 requires that member governments accord service suppliers from other member 
countries national treatment, that is, a foreign service or service provider may not 
be treated any less favorably than a domestic provider of the service; and 
 allows members to negotiate further reductions in barriers to trade in services. 
Importantly, unlike MFN treatment and the other principles listed in Part II, which apply to all 
service providers more or less unconditionally, the obligations under Part III are restricted. They 
apply only to those services and modes of delivery listed in each member’s schedule of 
commitments. Thus, unless a member country has specifically committed to open its market to 
service suppliers in a particular service that is provided via one or more of the four modes of 
delivery, the national treatment and market access obligations do not apply. This is often referred 
                                                 
41 The GATS differs from the GATT in that it allows members to take temporary exemptions to MFN treatment at the 
time of accession or through a waiver process. The exemptions are listed in a special annex to the GATS. The GATS 
(as is the case of the GATT) also allows MFN exemptions in the cases of regional agreements. 
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to as the positive list approach to trade commitments. Each member country’s schedule of 
commitments is contained in an annex to the GATS.42 The schedules of market access 
commitments are, in essence, the core of the GATS. 
Parts IV-VI (Articles XIX-XXIX) are technical elements of the agreement. Among other things, 
they require that, no later than 2000, the GATS members start new negotiations (which they did) 
to expand coverage of the agreement and that conflicts between members involving 
implementation of the GATS are to be handled in the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. The 
GATS also includes eight annexes, including one on MFN exemptions. Another annex provides a 
“prudential carve out,” that is, a recognition that governments take “prudent” actions to protect 
investors or otherwise maintain the integrity of the national financial system. These prudent 
actions are allowed, even if they conflict with obligations under the GATS. 
Not all of the issues in services were resolved when the Uruguay Round negotiations ended in 
1994. Fifty-six WTO members, mostly developed economies, negotiated and concluded an 
agreement in 1997 in which they made commitments on financial services. The schedules of 
commitments largely reflected national regimes already in place.43 Furthermore, 69 WTO 
members negotiated and concluded an agreement in 1997 on telecommunications services. That 
agreement laid out principles on competition safeguards, interconnection policies, regulatory 
transparency, and the independence of regulatory agencies. Both agreements were added to the 
GATS as protocols.44 Today, a total of 108 WTO members have made some level of commitment 
to facilitate trade in telecommunications services.45 
Services and the Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round) 
Article XIX of the GATS required WTO members to begin a new set of negotiations on services 
in 2000 as part of the so-called WTO “built-in agenda” to complete what was unfinished during 
the Uruguay Round and to expand the coverage of the GATS to further liberalize trade in 
services. However, because no agreement was reached, the services negotiations were folded—
along with agriculture and nonagriculture negotiations—into the agenda of the Doha 
Development Agenda (Doha Round) round that launched in December 2001.46  
U.S. priorities in the services negotiations included the following areas:  
 removing unnecessary restrictions on foreign providers establishing a 
commercial presence;  
 improving the quality of commitments from what was established originally in 
the GATS; 
                                                 
42 More information on GATS schedules can be found at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm.  
43 Marchetti, Juan A., Financial Services Liberalization in the WTO and PTAs, in Juan A. Marchetti, Juan A. and 
Martin Roy, (eds), Opening Markets for Trade in Services: Countries and Sectors in Bilateral WTO Negotiations, 
World Trade Organization, Cambridge University, 2008, p. 323.  
44 Tuthill, L. Lee and Laura B. Sherman, Telecommunications: Can Trade Agreements Keep Up with Technology?, in 
Marchetti, Juan A. and martin Roy, (eds), Opening Markets for Trade in Services: Countries and Sectors in Bilateral 
WTO Negotiations, World Trade Organization, Cambridge University, 2008. 
45World Trade Organization, Services: Sector by Sector Telecommunications services, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_e.htm. 
46 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10002, The World Trade Organization, by Ian F. Fergusson and Rachel 
F. Fefer. 
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 regulatory transparency so that foreign services providers are better informed 
about host country regulations that may affect them; and 
 expanding market access in financial services, telecommunication services, 
express delivery, energy services, environmental services, distribution services, 
education and training services, professional services, computer and related 
services, and audiovisual and advertising services.  
In general, the Doha Round negotiations were characterized by persistent differences among 
developed and developing countries on major issues in tariffs and nontariff barriers for goods, 
services, and agriculture. For example, developing countries (including emerging economic 
powerhouses such as China, Brazil, and India) sought the reduction of agriculture tariffs and 
subsidies among developed countries, nonreciprocal market access for manufacturing sectors, and 
protection for their services industries. In contrast, the United States, the EU, and other developed 
countries sought reciprocal trade liberalization, especially commercially meaningful access to 
advanced developing countries' industrial and services sectors, while attempting to retain some 
measure of protection for their agricultural sectors. The developed countries also sought to 
incorporate new issues that impact services, such as digital trade (data flows, cybertheft, and trade 
secrets) and global value chains.  
The complexity of the services agenda and the number of players involved may have contributed 
to the lack of progress in the Doha Round negotiations. The term “services” includes a broad 
range of economic activities, many with few characteristics in common except that they are not 
goods. The trade barriers exporters face differ across service sectors, making the formulation of 
trade rules a significant challenge. For example, licensing regulations are especially important to 
professional service providers, such as lawyers and medical professionals, while data transfer 
regulations are important to financial services providers. Furthermore, services negotiations 
include many participants. In addition to trade ministers, they include representatives of finance 
ministries and regulatory agencies, many of whom do not consider trade liberalization a primary 
part of their mission. In addition, negotiators found it difficult to formulate mechanisms that 
distinguish between government regulations that are purely protectionist and those that have 
legitimate purposes.47  
After 14 years, the divisions in the Doha Round called into question the viability of the "single 
undertaking" (one package to address all trade issues together) type of negotiation and some 
parties voiced a need for institutional reform. After the WTO's 2015 Ministerial was held in 
Nairobi, Kenya, the Ministerial Declaration acknowledged the division over the future of the 
Doha Round, and failed to reaffirm its continuation. Despite the disagreements, there was some 
progress in certain issues, such as the LDC Services Waiver to provide preferential treatment to 
least-developed countries (LDCs) for specific service sectors and modes.48  
Frustration with the Doha Round negotiations has likely contributed to the proliferation of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements that include provisions on services and services-related 
activities (for example, foreign direct investment) and for alternative frameworks.  
                                                 
47 Bernard Hoekman, and Aaditya Mattoo, Regulatory Cooperation and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 
Cordell Hull Institute, Trade Policy Roundtable, October 1, 2007, p. 9.  
48 For more on WTO, See CRS In Focus IF10002, The World Trade Organization, by Ian F. Fergusson and Rachel F. 
Fefer. World Trade Organization, “Eleven Members Notify Preferential Measures in Support of LDC Services,” WTO: 
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Services in U.S. FTAs  
The United States has made services a priority in each of the 15 FTAs it has negotiated that cover 
trade with 20 countries (including the U.S.-Canada FTA, which was superseded by the entry into 
force of the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] on January 1, 1994). While the 
specific treatment of services differs among the FTAs because of the status of U.S. trade relations 
with the partner(s) involved and the evolution of issues involved, the FTAs share some 
characteristics that define a framework of U.S. policy priorities. Some of the major characteristics 
are examined below. Some of these aspects reaffirm adherence to principles embedded in the 
GATS, while others go beyond the GATS.  
Negative List  
Each U.S. FTA uses a negative list in determining market access and national treatment coverage 
and commitments from each partner. A negative list means that the FTA provisions for market 
access and national treatment apply to all categories and subcategories of services in all modes of 
delivery, unless a party to the agreement has listed a service or mode of delivery as an exception. 
The negative list also implies that a newly created or domestically provided service is 
automatically covered under the FTA unless it is specifically listed as an exception in an annex to 
the agreement. The negative list approach is widely considered to be more comprehensive and 
flexible than the positive list, which is used in the GATS and which some other countries use in 
their bilateral and regional FTAs.  
Rules of Origin 
Under FTAs in which the United States is a party, any service provider is eligible irrespective of 
ownership nationality as long as that provider is an enterprise organized under the laws of either 
the United States or the other party(ies) or is a branch conducting business in the territory of a 
party. Such criteria potentially expand the benefits of the FTA to service providers from other 
countries that are not direct parties to the FTA. For example, a U.S. subsidiary of a Canadian-
owned insurance company would be covered by the U.S.-South Korea FTA. The FTAs do allow 
one party to deny benefits to a provider located in the territory of another party, if that provider is 
owned or controlled by a person from a nonparty country and does not conduct substantial 
business in the territory of the other party, or if the party denying the benefits does not otherwise 
conduct normal economic relations with the nonparty country.49  
Multiple Chapters on Services 
In many U.S. FTAs, trade in services spans several chapters, indicating its prominence in U.S. 
trade policy, the complexity in addressing services trade barriers, and the specificity of U.S. trade 
policy negotiating objectives. Each FTA has a specific chapter on cross-border trade in services—
trade by all modes except commercial presence (Mode 3). This chapter requires the United States 
                                                 
49 These rules of origin are discussed in the context of the U.S.-Australian FTA in United States International Trade 
Commission, U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economywide and Selected Sectoral Effects, 
Investigation No. TA-2104-11, May 2004, p. 87, and Centre for International Economics (Australia), Economic 
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services. An enterprise of a Party is defined as “an enterprise organized or constituted under the laws of a Party; and a 
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exceptions are contained in Article 10.11 (Denial of Benefits). Similar provisions are contained in other U.S. FTAs. 
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and the FTA partner(s) to accord nondiscriminatory treatment—both MFN treatment and national 
treatment—to services originating in each other’s territory. The agreement prohibits the FTA 
partner-governments from imposing restrictions on the number of service providers, the total 
value of service transactions that can be provided, the total number of service operations or the 
total quantity of services output, or the total number of natural persons that can be employed in a 
services operation. In addition, the governments cannot require a service provider from the other 
FTA partner to have a presence in its territory in order to provide services. The FTA partners may 
exclude categories or subcategories of services from the agreement, which they designate in 
annexes. 
Each U.S. FTA also contains a chapter on foreign direct investment, including service providers 
that have a commercial presence (Mode 3) in the territory of an FTA partner and a chapter on 
intellectual property rights (IPR), which is also relevant to services trade.50 In addition, many U.S. 
FTAs contain separate provisions or chapters on specific service categories which have been 
priority areas in U.S. trade policy. They include the following: 
 Financial Services: The FTAs define financial services to “include all insurance 
and insurance-related services, and all banking and other financial services, as 
well as services incidental or auxiliary to a service of a financial nature.” Among 
other things, the financial services chapter allows governments to apply 
restrictions for prudential reasons and allows financial service providers from an 
FTA partner to sell a new financial service without additional legislative 
authority, if local service providers are allowed to provide the same service. 
 Telecommunication Services: The United States and trading partners agree that 
enterprises from each other’s territory are to have nondiscriminatory access to 
public telecommunications services. For example, both countries will ensure that 
domestic suppliers of telecommunications services who dominate the market do 
not engage in anticompetitive practices. They also ensure that public 
telecommunications suppliers provide enterprises based in the territory of the 
FTA partner with interconnection, number portability, dialing parity, and access 
to underwater cable systems. 
 e-commerce/Digital Trade: The FTAs include provisions to ensure that 
electronically supplied services are treated no less favorably than services 
supplied by other modes of delivery and that customs duties are not to be applied 
to digital products whether they are conveyed electronically or via a tangible 
medium such as a disk. Recent and ongoing trade negotiations seek to ensure 
open digital trade by prohibiting “forced” localization or other requirements that 
limit cross-border flows.51 
Regulatory Transparency 
Many U.S. FTAs require FTA partners to practice transparency when implementing and 
developing domestic regulations that affect services. In particular, the FTAs require the partner 
countries to provide notice of impending investigations that might affect service providers from 
                                                 
50 Services are also indirectly covered in U.S. bilateral investment treaties (BITs). For more information on BITs, see 
CRS Report R43052, U.S. International Investment Agreements: Issues for Congress, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and 
Martin A. Weiss.  
51 For more information, see CRS Report R44565, Digital Trade and U.S. Trade Policy, coordinated by Rachel F. 
Fefer.  
U.S. Trade in Services: Trends and Policy Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 20 
the other partner(s). The FTAs go beyond the transparency provisions in the GATS by providing 
mechanisms for interested parties to comment on proposed regulations and appeal adverse 
decisions.  
Regulatory Heterogeneity  
In addition to market access restrictions, firms operating in multiple countries or having a global 
supply chain may be subject to an array of local regulations that vary in each market, and impact 
the services that firms can access or sell. This regulatory heterogeneity, while neither 
discriminatory nor anticompetitive, may increase operational costs and thereby limit a firm’s 
ability to do business in a foreign market. For example, regulatory heterogeneity can limit the 
access of professional service providers (e.g., architects, doctors, etc.) whose licenses or 
certifications may not be recognized in foreign markets. Regulatory cooperation, such as when 
countries or regions harmonize to common standards or establish mutual recognition, can help 
minimize the impact of the differing regulatory regimes.52 Regulatory cooperation to ease trade in 
services may occur outside or within the context of trade agreement negotiations. Regulatory 
cooperation in financial services under the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision that drafted 
BASEL III53 and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) efforts toward recognition of 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for accounting standards54 are examples 
of international regulatory cooperation happening outside of FTA negotiations. The U.S.-South 
Korea FTA is one example of using FTA negotiations to address differing regulatory regimes for 
services. 
                                                 
52 Aaditya Mattoo, Services Trade and Regulatory Cooperation, E15, July 2015, http://e15initiative.org/. 
53 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10035, Introduction to Financial Services: Banking, by Raj Gnanarajah.  
54 Securities and Exchange Commission, Commission Statement in Support of Convergence and Global Accounting, 
RELEASE NOS. 33-9109; 34-61578, 2010, https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/33-9109.pdf, and U.S. International 
Trade Commission, Recent Trends in U.S. Services Trade: 2017 Annual Report, Investigation Number: 332-345, May 
2017, p. 63, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4682.pdf. 
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A Recent Case Study: The U.S.-South Korea FTA (KORUS FTA)55 
On March 15, 2012, the U.S.-South Korean FTA (KORUS FTA) entered into force. Industry representatives referred 
to the services-related provisions of the agreement as “the gold standard” for the treatment of services in FTAs. 
However, concerns have been raised regarding implementation and the effectiveness of the agreement’s provisions. 
Examining some of the KORUS provisions may provide an indication of trends for U.S. objectives and issues in trade 
in services in current services trade negotiations. 
The United States sought transparency provisions to ensure transparency into the South Korean trading and 
regulatory systems. Under KORUS, each side agreed to publish relevant regulations and administrative decisions as 
well as proposed regulations; allow persons from the other party to make comments and ask questions regarding 
proposed regulations; notify such persons of administrative proceedings and allow them to make presentations before 
final administrative action is taken; and allow such persons to request review and appeal of administrative decisions. 
For the first time in any trade agreement, KORUS contains in the financial services annex a specific reference to data 
transfer, enabling U.S. companies to freely transfer customer data into and out of a partner country. Data transfer has 
become a significant U.S. objective in current trade agreement negotiations as globalization has fragmented business 
operations across borders and multinational firms want to be able to maintain central locations for data storage and 
avoid having to locate servers in multiple locations. In doing so, the multinational companies confront some 
governments’ privacy concerns and localization requirements. Under KORUS, the United States worked with South 
Korea to revise the latter’s vague guidelines, strict rules, and lengthy application process after U.S. stakeholders raised 
concerns about South Korea’s implementation of commitments to allow data transfers. 
The role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in services trade is another U.S. trade policy issue addressed in KORUS, 
making it a possible model for other U.S. FTAs.56 Under KORUS, South Korea agreed that those entities will be 
subject to an independent state regulator as opposed to being self-regulated.  
In telecommunications services, South Korea agreed to reduce government restrictions on foreign ownership of 
South Korean telecommunications companies. 
The United States sought greater reciprocity and market openness in the treatment of professional services. The 
United States and South Korea agreed to form a professional services working group to develop methods to 
recognize mutual standards and criteria for the licensing of professional service providers. 
Legal services represent one area where there have been implementation challenges. While specific commitments 
were made to open up the legal services market over three stages, the United States voiced concern about recent 
legislation that could limit the benefits expected under KORUS. In addition to its KORUS commitments, South Korea 
has also committed to opening up its legal services market to foreign law firms in its free trade agreements with the 
EU, the UK, Australia, and Canada. 
Services in the Current Trade Promotion Authority 
The Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation signed into law on June 29, 2015,57 contained 
specific provisions establishing U.S. trade negotiating objectives on services trade (P.L. 114-26). 
The text broadly states that “[t]he principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding 
trade in services is to expand competitive market opportunities for the United States.” Congress 
also specifically pointed to the utilization of global value chains and supported pursuing the 
objectives of reducing or eliminating trade barriers through “all means, including through a 
plurilateral agreement” with partners able to meet high standards.  
Congress provided objectives specific to “digital trade in goods and services and cross-border 
data flows,” instructing the President to ensure that cross-border data flows and electronically 
                                                 
55 For more information, see CRS Report RL34330, The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): 
Provisions and Implementation, coordinated by Brock R. Williams.  
56 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are businesses that are directly or indirectly controlled by the government. U.S. 
SOEs include the U.S. postal system.  
57 For more information on TPA, see CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson, 
and CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, by Ian F. 
Fergusson.  
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delivered goods and services have the same level of coverage and protection as those in physical 
form, and are not impeded by regulation, excepting for legitimate objectives. Congress 
recognized the challenges presented by localization regulations, and sought to ensure that trade 
agreements eliminate and prevent measures requiring the locating of “facilities, intellectual 
property, or other assets in a country.” 
 Services negotiation likely will take place in the upcoming renegotiation of NAFTA based on the 
provisions of trade promotion authority (TPA). Services discussions related to TiSA, TPP, and T-
TIP (see below) took place during the Obama Administration. While President Trump withdrew 
U.S. participation in the TPP, the future of TiSA and T-TIP is uncertain. Congress may review 
potential results of NAFTA and possibly other agreements against the negotiation objectives set 
in TPA if and when it considers legislation necessary to implement the agreements.  
The Potential Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA)  
Largely because of the lack of progress in the Doha Round of negotiations in the WTO, a group 
of 23 WTO members—including the United States—is engaged in discussions on a possible 
sector-specific, plurilateral agreement to liberalize trade in services among them.58 The group 
accounts for around 70% of world trade in services.59 Negotiations on a proposed Trade in 
Services Agreement (TiSA) were launched in April 2013. The United States and Australia have 
been at the forefront of the TiSA negotiations, with other WTO members, including some 
developing countries, becoming increasingly active as the discussions progress. 
While not directly linked currently to the WTO, TiSA participants are taking as their guide the 
“Elements of Political Guidance” issued at the end of the 8th WTO ministerial in December 2011. 
It stipulated that members could pursue negotiations outside of the single undertaking in order to 
accomplish the objectives of the Doha Round.60  
For proponents of services trade liberalization, the plurilateral approach offers some advantages: 
 progress in the services negotiations would no longer be tied to progress in other 
negotiations as has been in the case under the “single-undertaking” rule in the 
Doha Round; 
 participating members include those countries that account for the majority of 
global services trade; 
 since negotiations are confined to countries willing to negotiate, prospects for a 
successful conclusion may be enhanced; 
 coverage of the agreement can be expanded as countries accede to its provisions; 
and  
                                                 
58 The participating members are: Australia; Canada; Chile; Taiwan (Chinese Taipei); Colombia; Costa Rica; the EU; 
Hong Kong; Iceland; Israel; Japan; Korea; Liechtenstein; Mauritius, Mexico; New Zealand; Norway; Pakistan; 
Panama; Peru; Switzerland; the United States; and Turkey. Uruguay and Paraguay had been participants but recently 
withdrew from negotiations. Contrary to the WTO MFN principle, a plurilateral agreement applies only to those 
countries that have signed it. The WTO has allowed such exceptions to MFN, such as the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement.  
59 Swiss National Center for Competence in Research: A Plurilateral Agenda for Services?: Assessing the Case for a 
Trade in Services Agreement, Working Paper No. 2013/29, May 2013, p. 10. 
60 Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Briefing The Plurilateral Agreement on Services: at the starting 
gate, European Parliament, DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2013_57, February 2013. 
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 negotiating members are likely to be more willing to commit to reducing barriers 
to trade and services beyond the limited commitments under the GATS and the 
offers made during the Doha Round. 
However, critics highlight possible drawbacks to the approach: 
 TiSA participants do not as a group currently include some of the economically 
significant emerging economies, such as Brazil, India, and China, which present 
larger potential market opportunities for services but also impose significant 
impediments to trade and investment in services; 
 breaking from the single-undertaking framework could undermine the 
opportunity for concessions in other areas, including agriculture and 
manufactured goods, that result from the “give-and-take” of broader negotiations; 
and 
 a plurilateral services pact might diminish the credibility of the multilateral trade 
negotiation framework at a time when its credibility has already been weakened 
by the stalled Doha Round. 
The participants agreed to a framework of five basic objectives on which the negotiations are to 
be conducted.61 The agreement should  
(1) be compatible with the GATS to attract broad participation and possibly be brought within 
the WTO framework in the future; 
(2) be comprehensive in scope, with no exclusions of any sector or mode of supply; 
(3) include commitments that correspond as closely as possible to applied practices and 
provide opportunities for improved market access; 
(4) include new and enhanced disciplines to be developed on the basis of proposals brought 
forward by participants during the negotiations; and 
(5) be open to new participants who share the objectives but also should take into account the 
development objectives of least developed countries (LDCs). 
Participants needed to decide whether to schedule trade liberalization commitments according to 
a negative list or a positive list. As noted earlier, under a negative list, the FTA provisions apply to 
all categories and subcategories of services in all modes of delivery, unless a party to the 
agreement has listed a service or mode of delivery as an exception. In contrast, under a positive 
list, each party must specifically opt in for a service to be covered. The United States typically 
prefers the more comprehensive and flexible negative list approach. Because of disagreements 
within the group, and to be compatible with GATS, TiSA negotiating parties decided to use a 
“hybrid” approach: market access obligations are being negotiated under a positive list, while 
national treatment obligations are being negotiated under a negative list.62 
Another issue was the application of the TiSA commitments to nonparticipants. The participants 
agreed to conduct the negotiations on a non-MFN basis, that is, the benefits of the commitments 
made by the participants in the TiSA would apply to only those countries that have signed on to 
the agreement, thereby avoiding “free-riders.” This exception to the general WTO MFN principle 
is consistent with Article V of the GATS, which allows WTO members to form preferential 
                                                 
61 Daniel Pruzin, “EU Commission to Seek Negotiating Mandate,” International Trade Daily, February 19, 2013. 
62 Inside U.S. Trade, “USTR Says It Will Seek To Cover New Services In Plurilateral Agreement,” January 17, 2013. 
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agreements to liberalize trade in services as long as the agreement has substantial service sectoral 
coverage and provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination between 
or among the parties.  
Many members of the U.S. business community, especially service providers and related 
industries, strongly support the formation of TiSA. They view the agreement as an opportunity to 
strengthen rules and achieve greater market access on trade in services beyond what are contained 
in the GATS—which are largely considered to be weak. 
Some opponents of trade-in-services liberalization, such as labor unions and some civil society 
groups, argue that, rather than employing TiSA as a means to expand on the GATS, it should be 
used to reverse what they consider to be infringements of GATS provisions on the authority of 
national, state, and local governments to regulate services.  
Since negotiations launched in April 2013, 21 rounds of TiSA negotiations and intercessional 
meetings occurred in an effort to make further progress. The agreement, whose status is 
unknown, would likely include a core text, as well as sections on transparency, movement of 
natural persons, domestic regulation, and government procurement. The current text is said to 
contain sectoral annexes for air transport, e-commerce, maritime transport, telecommunications, 
and financial services. As many of these topics and sectors may be sensitive or controversial 
among and within some of the negotiating parties, the final structure of TiSA is not yet decided.  
One area of contention is whether “new services” would be included under the nondiscrimination 
obligations. While the United States supports the inclusion of all yet-to-be-defined services, the 
EU has stated that it wants to preserve so-called policy space in that area and exempt all new 
services.63 The e-commerce annex reportedly covers cross-border data flows, consumer online 
protection, interoperability, and international regulatory cooperation, among other provisions.64 
To date, however, the EU has not engaged in discussions on data flows, creating an obstacle in the 
negotiations. As financial services may not be covered by the e-commerce provisions, the United 
States separately proposed a ban on data localization for financial services that the parties 
continue to discuss.65 
For professional services, current negotiations do not include explicit mutual recognition 
agreements, but rather discussion aims to recognition of foreign professionals and expedite 
licensing procedures. 
One issue that has emerged is China’s interest in joining the TiSA negotiations. While the issue is 
still pending, it has generated differences among the participants. Reportedly, the United States 
had expressed concerns about China’s readiness to undertake the commitments that TiSA would 
require, given China’s limited implementation of other agreements to date; the EU had argued for 
China’s participation sooner.66 The United States and a subset of the other participants were to 
review China’s level of compliance with and implementation of other trade agreements. To date, 
no other large emerging market has expressed interest in joining TiSA. However, the agreement 
overall is reportedly being structured so that it can be “multi-lateralized” in the future and 
                                                 
63 European Commission, “Report of the 21st TiSA negotiation round,” November 17, 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2016/november/tradoc_155095.pdf. and European Commission, “European Union Schedule of Specific 
Commitments and List of MFN Exemptions,” November 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/november/
tradoc_155091.docx.pdf.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Washington Trade Daily, “TPP Data Fix Floated in TTIP, TISA Rounds; Brady Hopeful on Enforcement,” July 14, 
2016. 
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incorporated into the GATS and made applicable to all WTO members.67 The chances or timeline 
of such an event are uncertain, as the TiSA itself remains uncertain. The Trump Administration 
has not stated an official position on the continuation of TiSA negotiations, but USTR Robert 
Lighthizer indicated that the Trump Administration may support its continuation.68 
TiSA arguably has been a significant focal point of trade policy on services for the United States 
and other major trade powers. If successful, it could form the basis of multilateral rules on trade 
in services for the 21st century.69 The United States is engaged with other trade dialogues, 
including the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
potential Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), in which trade in services is 
playing an important role and where U.S. objectives could complement as well as overlap with 
U.S. objectives in the TiSA.  
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
On May 18, 2017, the Trump Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to 
begin talks with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate NAFTA.70 Since its entry into force on 
January 1, 1994, NAFTA largely has been responsible for the economic integration of the North 
America continent as well as the creation of a more competitive North American marketplace. 
Today, North American countries rely on services trade to move and track products across borders 
multiple times before a finished product is ready for its final sale.  
The original NAFTA includes chapters on cross-border trade in services, telecommunications, and 
financial services, as well as temporary entry for business persons.71 Unlike TiSA, the NAFTA 
employs the “negative list approach” for liberalization of cross-border trade in services so that the 
provisions apply to all types of services unless specifically excluded by a partner country as a 
reservation or nonconforming measure (NCM) listed in the agreement’s Annexes. The negative 
list approach implies that any new type of service that is developed after the agreement enters into 
force is automatically covered unless it is specifically excluded. 
The Trump Administration aims to “modernize” NAFTA through renegotiation by updating the 
provisions in multiple areas, including services and digital trade, two areas that were not 
comprehensively addressed by NAFTA. Many U.S. stakeholders see a NAFTA renegotiation as 
an opportunity to obtain greater market access into Canada and Mexico, regulatory harmonization 
across the three markets, and improved regional trade facilitation. However, Canada and Mexico 
also have goals to further open U.S. markets, and stakeholders in each country voice concerns 
that any renegotiation could potentially disrupt existing regional supply chains.72 
Some, including Members of Congress, have suggested that the provisions of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) could serve as a starting point for NAFTA negotiations, as both Canada and 
                                                 
67 European Commission, “Report of the 21st TiSA negotiation round,” November 17, 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2016/november/tradoc_155095.pdf. 
68 Inside U.S. Trade, “Lighthizer: TISA an 'important' agreement now under review,” June 21, 2017. 
69 For more information on TiSA, see CRS Report R44354, Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Negotiations: 
Overview and Issues for Congress, by Rachel F. Fefer.  
70 CRS Insight IN10706, North American Free Trade Agreement: Notification for Renegotiation, by M. Angeles 
Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson.  
71 The full text of the NAFTA can be found here: https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Texts-of-the-Agreement/
North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement. 
72 A full list of stakeholder views submitted to USTR is available at https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=USTR-
2017-0006. 
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Mexico were involved in TPP negotiations. The TPP was a proposed FTA among 12 Asia-Pacific 
countries, including the United States, to reduce and eliminate tariff and nontariff barriers on 
goods, services, and agriculture, and establish trade rules and disciplines that expand on existing 
WTO commitments and address new issues.73 Similar to other U.S. FTAs, due to the complexity 
of services trade barriers, TPP addressed services in multiple chapters, including Cross Border 
Trade in Services, Financial Services, Temporary Entry, Telecommunications, and Electronic 
Commerce. Updates to NAFTA could draw on the TPP chapters. 
On January 30, 2017, the United States gave notice to the other TPP signatories that it does not 
intend to ratify the agreement, effectively ending the U.S. ratification process and TPP's potential 
entry into force, unless the Administration changes its position. The 11 remaining TPP 
countries—Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, and Vietnam—continue to discuss how and if the TPP can come into force without the 
United States.74 
The Potential Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) 
Given the importance of services in the U.S. and EU economic relationship, the potential T-TIP 
could include provisions to address barriers in transatlantic trade in services. The general 
structure of the T-TIP agreement, including its services component, remains uncertain as the 
negotiations are currently on hold. One source of debate in the T-TIP negotiations is the treatment 
of financial services. The United States advocated including market access for financial services 
in T-TIP. However, the United States is currently opposed to discussing financial regulation, 
unlike the EU, which seeks to include both financial services market access and regulatory 
cooperation in T-TIP, viewing the two as connected. According to some observers, U.S. 
opposition is due to concern over the potential impact to ongoing implementation of financial 
services regulation under the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (frequently 
referred to as Dodd-Frank, P.L. 111-203). The United States is said to prefer handling regulatory 
cooperation through ongoing bilateral dialogues with the EU or through multilateral fora such as 
the G-20.75  
Both U.S. and EU negotiators have stated that their services offers under T-TIP would go beyond 
the commitments being discussed in TiSA (“TiSA-plus”).76 Though the U.S. proposal is not 
public, the services provisions in KORUS are a likely starting point (see text box on KORUS 
FTA). According to the former U.S. Trade Representative, the United States sought to “obtain 
improved market access in the EU on a comprehensive basis” and also “reinforce transparency, 
impartiality, and due process.”77 While the United States used a negative list approach in its FTA 
with South Korea, the EU used a positive list approach with the FTA it signed with South Korea 
                                                 
73 For more information on TPP, see CRS In Focus IF10000, TPP: Overview and Current Status, by Brock R. Williams 
and Ian F. Fergusson.  
74 Inside U.S. Trade, New Zealand ambassador: 'Clear evidence' TPP will move ahead without U.S., June 12, 2017. 
75 For more information on T-TIP, see CRS Report R43387, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) 
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that went into effect in 2010, which may lead T-TIP negotiators to adopt a hybrid approach 
similar to that being employed in TiSA negotiations.78  
With the 10th round of T-TIP negotiation, held in July 2015, the EU published its initial textual 
proposal on services, investment, and e-commerce.79 The proposal is based on a positive list of 
commitments so that sectors not specified would not be covered by the agreement; the EU offer 
did cover computer and telecommunications services, international maritime and air transport, 
and postal and courier services, as well as business and professional services. In addition to 
“carving out” public services, such as public health, education, social services, and water, the 
EU’s proposal excludes audiovisual services under a “cultural exception,”80 conforming to the 
limitations included in its original mandate to negotiate the T-TIP passed by the European 
Commission.81  
Unlike in TiSA, the EU proposal addresses worker mobility with a draft framework for mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications. Just as a mutual recognition agreement would cover the 
licensing requirements of all 50 states, it would cover those of all EU member states regardless of 
diversity among the member states’ own regulations.  
While electronic commerce is included in the EU proposal, it specifically excludes data flows and 
online consumer protection. U.S.-EU cross-border data flows are the highest in the world and, in 
2012, U.S. exports of digitally deliverable services to the EU were $140.6 billion while imports 
were $86.3 billion.82 The absence of these sensitive areas from the EU proposal has disappointed 
some in the U.S. business community.83 The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield agreement84 could help 
facilitate further discussions in T-TIP on data protection, as the agreement facilitates cross-border 
data flows between the United States and EU, though it faces challenges in court.85 
As stated, T-TIP negotiations are on hold as the Trump Administration has not stated if and when 
they will resume. 
Outlook 
To date, the record on liberalization of trade in services through reciprocal trade agreements is 
mixed. The 164 members of the WTO negotiated and have maintained a basic set of multilateral 
                                                 
78 For more information on KOREU, see CRS Report R41534, The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its 
Implications for the United States, by William H. Cooper et al.  
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R44257, U.S.-EU Data Privacy: From Safe Harbor to Privacy Shield, by Martin A. Weiss and Kristin Archick.  
85 Inside U.S. Trade, “Legal challenges against Privacy Shield begin to mount in Europe,” November 3, 2016. 
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rules in the form of the GATS. However, the GATS is largely viewed as limited in scope, 
predating significant technological developments over the past two decades, and in need of 
expansion if it is to be an effective instrument of trade liberalization. The efforts of the WTO 
members to expand on these rules have stalled, with little prospect of success at least in the 
foreseeable future. The lack of progress in the WTO Doha Round negotiations due to the 
complexity of the issues and parties involved has led to the rise of sector-specific plurilateral 
agreements as an alternative path forward. In negotiating TiSA, the United States has been 
pursuing a services-specific plurilateral agreement that includes the 28-member EU and Japan—
two of the most important U.S. trade partners—plus other participating countries. 
The United States has made services trade liberalization and rules-setting an important 
component of the FTAs it has negotiated over the past two decades. While these agreements have 
gone beyond the GATS in terms of coverage, they apply to a limited number of countries, 
accounting for small shares of U.S. trade in services.  
Issues for Congress 
The outlook for the ongoing negotiations remains uncertain, as participants in each negotiation 
deal with difficult and complex issues. Potential policy issues for Congress and negotiators to 
address include the following: 
 To what extent are U.S. positions on trade in services in the renegotiation of 
NAFTA, and TiSA and T-TIP if resumed, consistent with U.S. trade negotiating 
objectives on services as defined in the TPA legislation? How might Congress 
work with the Administration in relation to these pending negotiations? 
 What are the prospects for concluding each of these trade agreements with 
comprehensive and high-standard commitments on services? How could the 
conclusion of one agreement impact negotiations in the others? What impact 
would these proposed agreements have on the U.S. economy and various 
stakeholders? 
 Should Congress conduct hearings to examine potential new bilateral FTA 
negotiations with specific countries, such as other TPP members? 
 Could the pursuit of bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements undermine the 
pursuit of broader multilateral rules in the GATS or would it encourage future 
multilateral action? Would the United States be able to set common rules across 
sufficient bilateral and plurilateral agreements to cover services trade across its 
major partners without major discrepancies?  
 The United States has negotiated a number of FTAs with substantial services 
components. Might Congress direct USTR to use these FTAs to build a model 
services agreement that identifies U.S. interests across services? 
 Advancements in information technology expand the number and types of 
services that can be traded and help to create new types of services. Is it possible 
to develop a trade arrangement that is clear enough to be effective and flexible 
enough to take into account rapid changes in the services sector?  
 Available data measure only a limited set of sectors and countries across the 
various modes of international trade in services. To the degree that data help to 
determine policies, might Congress consider requiring the executive branch to 
collect more complete data where possible? 
U.S. Trade in Services: Trends and Policy Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 29 
 Might Congress consider directing the executive branch to pursue regulatory 
cooperation or mutual recognition efforts in specific service sectors to lessen the 
burdens created by varied regulatory regimes and requirements across different 
markets? Given the role of state regulators, how might federal policymakers 
involve them in ongoing and future trade negotiations or regulatory cooperation 
efforts? 
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